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## Too Much Light On Mr. Nixon

To the Editor of The Courant:

A new book by Richard Nixon entitled "Six Crises" sheds additional light on the most curious episode of the 1960 Presidential campaign. It also sheds some unflattering light on Nixon himself. The episode occurred two weeks before the election when Kennedy criticized the Eisenhower Administration for not giving more active support to Cuban freedom fighters. This, says Nixon in his book, was a dreadful criticism to make, because Kennedy had already been informed by Allen Dulles of the CIA that the Eisenhower Administration was secretly training Cuban exiles for an invasion attempt. Nixon contends, Kennedy was wilfully risking the security of the covert operation.

As often seems to happen with Nixon broadsides, this one is already backfiring. The White House has denied that Kennedy was informed of the Cuban invasion plans prior to the November election. The denial has been supported by Allen Dulles, who was then director of CIA. Mr. Dulles suggests that it was an "honest misunderstanding" on Nixon's part. Very likely this is a fair statement of the case. We can assume that Nixon was under a misapprehension on this score. But even if we accept this assumption, Nixon's explanation for his subsequent behavior on the Cuban issue is hard to justify.

In the face of the Kennedy speech about Cuba, Nixon concludes in his book, that he had no choice but to protect the secrecy of the invasion plans by taking the opposite point of view. Accordingly, during the fourth and final television debate a few days later, Nixon lit into the Kennedy statement with a great show of moral indignation, charging the intervention in Cuba's internal affairs would violate our treaty obligations, alienate our allies, and quite possibly risk World War III. Nixon, one of the authors of the Cuban intervention, found himself condemning the idea of intervention. "I was," he says in his book, "in the position of appearing to be softer on Castro than Kennedy—which was exactly the opposite of the truth." It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Nixon merely saw the Kennedy statement as an opportunity for scoring a debating point which would have the incidental benefit of putting himself on the side of international morality and enlightened liberalism. His contention that duty compelled him to commit this insincerity has the strong aroma of alter-the-fact rationalization.

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